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Abstract 
Pre-school education and care (PSEC) is often claimed as a ‘win-win’ policy which 
simultaneously enhances both economic competitiveness and social cohesion. High levels of 
PSEC are said to raise living standards by increasing female employment rates and 
improving young people’s skills and to mitigate inequalities by reducing social gaps in 
learning outcomes. Much of the evidence for this rests on analysis of data for a small number 
of countries. In this paper we test the claims using cross-national time series data for a large 
number of OECD countries. The analysis of determinants of employment rates, using a 
variety of controls, does confirm the association between PSEC participation levels and 
female employment rates. However, the cross-national analysis does not support the 
argument that raising aggregate levels of PSEC participation necessarily reduces social gaps 
in attainment at 15 years of age. Participation in PSEC increases educational performance at 
15 by similar amounts for children of all social groups in most countries. Social gaps in 
performance at 15 may only be mitigated by high levels of PSEC provision where children 
from less advantaged families get more – or better quality – provision. The recently 
announced Department for Education plan to extend free provision of PSEC for fifteen hours 
a week to two-year-old children from disadvantaged families (i.e. in care or qualifying for 
free school meals) therefore points in the right direction. However, it remains to be seen 
whether this will bias participation towards this group sufficiently to reduce inequalities in 
learning outcomes.   
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Introduction 
Debates about policy frequently involve identifying social and economic trade-offs. A policy 
which is designed to boost economic competitiveness may have negative social consequences 
or, conversely, policies designed to enhance social cohesion may come at a high economic 
cost. The tensions between economic and social goals seem particularly evident in times of 
economic austerity. However, social scientists occasionally identify macro policies which 
they claim would have clear benefits, both on the macro-economic and macro-social side. 
Publicly-funded pre-primary education and care (PSEC) is one such policy area. Esping-
Andersen (2009), in particular, has claimed that it represents a clear ‘win-win’ policy for 
developed countries. 
  
The argument, put simply, is that increasing the availability and take-up of good quality pre-
school education and care brings major economic and social benefits at the societal level. 
Affordable and accessible pre-school provision frees up mothers of young children to 
undertake paid work and is thus likely to increase the employment rates of mothers and 
female employment rates in general. Raising rates of employment makes an important 
contribution to raising GDP per capita and improving living standards and has been a central 
goal for European economies since the Kok Report (Kok, 2003). At the same time 
participation in pre-school education and external care is held to improve the cognitive 
abilities of young children which will help them to achieve more in their school education. As 
this feeds through to higher levels of skills and qualifications in the workforce this will 
benefit the economy through enhanced productivity. According to Esping-Andersen (2009) 
these macroeconomic gains would come at little net cost. Although publicly subsidized 
universal pre-school education is expensive, its costs to the exchequer are off-set by the 
increases in tax revenues which will accrue. Mothers who have access to good quality 
external care for their young children will take shorter maternity breaks from employment 
and thus be paying taxes on their earnings for several years when they would otherwise not 
be doing so. Their lifetime earnings, and so tax contributions, will also be enhanced, since 
they will not be so subject to the negative effects on women’s career trajectories which are 
often associated with extended periods of maternity leave. 
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The social gains from accessible and affordable pre-school education and care are seen to 
accrue from the effects on both mothers and their children. Mothers gain through having 
greater choice as to whether to return early to work after childbirth or to look after their 
children at home. Children are said to gain because participation in pre-school education, at 
least for those between 1 and 5 years, generally improves cognitive abilities which increase 
the educational benefits from later schooling. Esping-Andersen (2009) also claims that 
widespread participation equalises educational outcomes in the longer term, pointing in 
particular, to the effects of near universal provision in the Nordic countries. He claims that 
social gaps in the quality of parenting, and the time investments made by parents in their 
children, are growing, and that this may be increasing the unequal effects social inheritance 
on life chances and reducing social mobility in many countries. High levels of participation in 
pre-school education, he says, can mitigate against this trend and reduce inequalities in 
school performance, since the gains to disadvantaged children, he supposes, are greater than 
to other children. He offers the example of the Nordic countries where, between the 1960s 
and 1990s, participation in pre-school education and external care and maternal employment 
rose in tandem, at the same time as inequality in education outcomes decreased. 
 
The simultaneous social and economic benefits of widespread pre-school education and care, 
particularly as exemplified in the Nordic states, would seem to be highly impressive, yet few 
countries have invested sufficiently to universalise pre-school participation. Is the case in 
favour as clear cut as it would seem? Or do the benefits vary across countries, according to 
other contextual factors. In this paper we seek to test again the robustness of the claims using 
time-series international data on participation and female employment (full and part-time) 
and the cross-sectional international data from PISA on pre-school participation and 
inequalities in educational outcomes at age 15. We find that the relationships vary 
considerably across countries due to a variety of contextual factors.  
 
The claims about the impact of pre-school education and care on female employment rates 
seem to be the most robust, although even here the patterns across countries are complex. 
Central and Eastern European countries, for instance, have seen gradual increases in pre-
school participation since the 1980s but female employment levels have gone down from 
their previously quite high levels in some countries (the Czech Republic and Poland) and flat-
lined in others (Hungary and Slovakia). Mediterranean states have generally seen 
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improvements in both participation and female employment rates between 1980 and 2010, 
but these did not occur simultaneously, with female employment rates not rising sharply until 
the mid 1990s, somewhat after the participation rates began to rise from their previously 
comparatively low levels.  In the Netherlands rates of female employment rose rapidly during 
the period whilst pre-school attendance was going down until the last couple of years.  
 
Our analysis of the social benefits of pre-school education are more equivocal. The evidence 
for the benefits of PSEC to the child’s cognitive levels and later school performance seem 
robust enough, as the literature demonstrates, at least with regards to those participating 
between 1 and 5 years. However, there is little evidence across countries of high levels of 
pre-school participation reducing inequalities of educational outcomes at 15, as Esping-
Andersen has claimed. The effects seem to vary across countries probably according to the 
distribution of participation across social groups and the quality of provision accessed by 
different groups.  
 
Pre-School Education and Female Employment 
There is a wealth of research evidence from different countries attesting to the positive 
impact of PSEC on the employment levels of mothers of small children and female 
employment levels generally. Various studies have analysed area data for particular countries 
to estimate the effects of variations in the affordability and availability of PSEC on female 
employment rates. Other studies have used cross-country time series data to analyse the 
relationship between PSEC participation and female employment rates. Most of the evidence 
points to a positive effect of factors pre-disposing participation and actual participation on 
female employment rates.  
 
A number of studies in the US (Heckman, 1974; Connelly, 1992; Ribar, 1995; Kimmel, 1998; 
Powell, 2002) show that costly child care acts as a barrier to employment for women. Mason 
and Kuhlthau (1992, 915) found that up to 30% of mothers of pre-school age children in the 
US felt constrained in their employment due to childcare problems. Chevalier and Viitanen 
(2002) report, on the basis of the 1988 Family Resources Survey, that over 20% of British 
women aged 18-44 stated that childcare obligations restricted their employment possibilities. 
Their own analysis uses Labour Force Survey data from 1992 to 1999 on the proportion of 
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women aged 16-59, with a youngest child less than 5 years old, who are active in the labour 
force (ILO definition) and administrative data on the supply of child care. During the period 
the proportion of childcare workers increased by 50%, places in nurseries by 120%, 
childminders by 30%, whilst playgroups declined by 15%. The supply of childcare, lagged by 
five quarters, correlates with the female labour supply. 
 
Simonsen’s (2010) analysis of Denmark uses regional variations in cost and availability of 
PSEC up to 2001. Day care in Denmark is largely publicly funded and organised by the 
municipalities which provide all day nursery places for children of 2-5 years and all-day 
family day care (mostly in public centres) for children aged 0-2. The municipalities are bound 
to provide nursery or home care provision for any child over 6 months where at least 67% of 
the costs must be borne by the state.  In 2002, 96% of children aged 3-5 years and 61% of 
children aged 0-2 years were in publicly-organised PSEC. However, availability and costs to 
parents vary between areas. She finds that an increase in the cost to parents of childcare by 1 
Euro per month will decrease the female employment rate (during the first 12 months after 
childbirth) by around 0.08%.  The effect on female employment propensity (for women 8-15 
months after childbirth) where childcare is fully available (without waiting lists) is 6%. 
 
Another study (Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000) analyses the effect of the costs and availability 
of PSEC in western Germany where most provision is provided by the municipal authorities. 
Since 1996 local authorities have been obliged to offer day care for all children 3-6 for half a 
day each day but there is still some variation in availability between states and often very few 
day care slots for infants. Fees are means-tested and set quite low to cover only 10-20 % of 
operating costs. Given the very limited private day care market, and the low costs of public 
provision, it is availability rather than costs which are most salient for female employment. 
Kreyenfeld and Hank model availability of PSEC places (slots per 1000 children) and female 
employment rates, controlling for the age of the youngest child, mother’s education, single 
parenthood, partner’s wage and regional employment rates. They find that the likelihood of a 
women being employed is unaffected by single parent status and regional unemployment 
levels but rises where the mother is more educated. The chance of a mother being employed 
full-time increases with her partner’s earnings and the chance of being employed full- or part- 
time rises with the age of the child up to four years. The availability of child care has more 
impact than the cost, but only has a small effect on the mother’s propensity to employment.  
7 
 
This, they argue, is probably because the limited hours of day care restrict the mothers’ 
ability to work anyway.  
 
In addition to the effects of availability and costs of PSEC, maternal employment rates are 
likely to be influenced by mothers’ preferences for either staying at home to look after young 
children or returning to work soon after childbirth and making use of external child care. 
Evans and Kelly (2001) analyse women’s preferences across countries using International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data. They find considerable variation with, for instance, 
Australian mothers generally preferring to stay at home with young children, and mothers in 
ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe being more likely to want to return 
early to work. Better educated women, they find, are more likely to want to return to work, 
perhaps because their higher qualifications give them access to better paid employment which 
is more likely to provide them a net income gain after they have met the costs of the child 
care. According to Evans and Kelly, actual employment levels of mothers exceeds their 
preferences in 13 out of 23 countries for which data are available. If maternal employment 
rates are affected by the costs and availability of PSEC, as they appear to be, they are also 
affected by women’s preferences and cultural traditions regarding family life in different 
countries. 
 
All in all, the evidence from intra-country studies does seem to be that access to PSEC has a 
positive effect on maternal employment levels in many countries, even given other contextual 
influences. A cross-country study of the lagged effects of different variables on PSEC rates 
provides added evidence of this. O’Connor’s (1988) study, using data for 68 countries 
between 1965 and 1980, is designed to illuminate the factors driving rises in PSEC 
enrolments across countries and female employment is just one of a number of hypothesised 
factors considered. These latter also include: the power of the state, levels of economic 
development and enrolments in primary, secondary and tertiary education.  The dependent 
variable used in the regression analysis was the pre-school enrolment rate for 1980, the goal 
being to capture the lagged effects of variables measured in 1965 on enrolment rates in 1980, 
while controlling for the effects of independent variables at the earlier time point and for 
enrolment rates in 1960. Pre-school enrolments were standardised for comparability by the 
construction of a ratio of the gross enrolment figure for each country (taken from UNESCO 
data) in the numerator and the population aged 0-4 in the denominator. The analysis shows 
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that most of the independent variables – including the strength and pervasiveness of the state, 
and increased enrolments in school education – have no significant effects on PSEC 
enrolment rates. Levels of economic development, when controlling for women’s 
participation in the labour force, had no significant positive effects for developed or 
developing countries. However, women’s labour force participation had a significant positive 
effect on PSEC enrolment rates within the developed countries. O’Connor breaks down the 
analysis for all countries by types of employment and finds that while women’s participation 
in agriculture has no effect, their participation in industrial and service sector employment in 
developed countries has a significant positive effect. O’Connor interprets the findings as 
showing that the main driver for increased pre-school enrolment in developed countries has 
been the rising demand by mothers participating in paid, non-agricultural employment. 
Although this study, using a time lagged procedure, reverses the causality of other studies, it 
supports the notion that availability of PSEC and maternal employment rates are related. 
  
The Social Benefits of Pre-School Education and Care  
The importance of early learning for children’s cognitive development and future learning 
has been emphasised in many recent studies and the research that demonstrates this has been 
taken very seriously by policy-makers in a number of countries (Waldfogel, 2004). Recent 
studies based on the analysis of longitudinal data in the UK suggest that up to half of the gap 
in children’s cognitive abilities is already established by the age of 11 years (Goodman et al, 
2011) or earlier. This does not, of course, mean that formal schooling at primary or secondary 
level makes no difference to the distribution of educational outcomes. Up to half of the gap in 
cognitive development appears during that period and will be in part due to the schooling 
process. Moreover, inequalities in the broader educational outcomes, over and above those of 
tested cognitive ability, will emerge, and they are also important. However, it remains the 
case that learning during the early years is highly important to a child’s cognitive and broader 
educational development and that different experiences of parenting and early years 
education and care do appear to contribute substantially to social inequalities in educational 
performance.  As Esping-Andersen (2009) writes: ‘If the race is already half run before the 
child begins school, then we clearly need to examine what happens in the early years.’ These 
early years affect much that happens in the child’s schooling later on. ‘Like it or not, says 
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Esping-Andersen, ‘the most important mental and behavioural patterns, once established, are 
difficult to change once children enter school.’ (p. 81). 
 
Waldfogel (2004) provides a useful review of recent international research on early cognitive 
development. She acknowledges that the research shows that there are multiple influences on 
development in the early years, and classifies these into three types which include child 
endowments, parenting and home environment and pre-school education and care. She says 
that what parents do generally matters more than what early schooling does, but that the latter 
can be effective. The research suggests that maternal employment in the first year of the 
child’s life can be detrimental to cognitive development and be associated with behavioural 
problems, particularly if the mother’s employment is full-time and from very early after 
childbirth. However, the research also shows that high quality PSEC is advantageous to 
children aged one year and above. Research in the UK and the US, based both on 
experimental PSEC programmes and using large-scale longitudinal surveys, generally 
suggests that there are significant cognitive gains to children over the age of one from 
receiving high quality PSEC. This is particularly the case for those attending centres which 
integrate care and learning and where the teachers are well qualified. In some studies the 
benefits are particularly marked for children from more disadvantaged homes.  OECD studies 
(2010, p. 98) also suggest that PSEC improves performance in skills measured at 15 years. 
Over 72% of those tested at 15 years in the PISA 2009 study had received one or more years 
of pre-primary education. After controlling for social background, attending a year or more of 
PSEC was associated, on average across the OECD, with a 33 point gain in test scores at 15 
years. In all countries children who participated for more than a year in PSEC got, on 
average, higher scores at 15 than those who didn’t.  
 
There is a fairly widespread consensus that high quality PSEC brings educational advantages 
to children after the first year. The cognitive gains associated with PSEC will enhance later 
learning and skills acquisition. The higher level of education and skills to which it contributes 
is, in turn, associated with a wide range of social and health benefits to the individual. So in 
this sense there is clear evidence of aggregate social gain from having accessible PSEC and 
high levels of participation in this. However, what is not so clear is whether high levels of 
participation tend to lead to the equalisation of educational outcomes and whether this could 
be seen to represent another measure of social gain. More equal distributions of skills and 
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qualifications amongst adults are associated cross-nationally with more equal income 
distributions and these, in turn, are associated with a wide range of social goods, including 
better public health, lower rates of crime, and higher levels of trust (see Green, Preston and 
Janmaat, 2006; Green and Janmaat, 2011; Wilkinson, 1996; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). 
Whether PSEC contributes to social gains through distributional effects as well as aggregate 
effects is not so clear.  
 
Esping-Andersen (2009) has recently argued that universalising PSEC does contribute to 
equalising educational outcomes. In particular, he argues, that where there is near universal 
participation in consistently high quality PSEC for young children, as in the Scandinavian 
countries, this is contributing towards reducing social gaps in educational achievement at the 
end of compulsory schooling.  In much of Europe attendance at Kindergarten for children 
aged 3-6 is near universal already, but attendance amongst 1-3 year olds is often much less so 
– at about 30% in Belgium, the Netherlands and the US, and at only around 10% in Austria, 
Germany and southern European countries (p. 93). What distinguishes the Scandinavian 
countries –  and what most contributes towards their relatively equal educational outcomes at 
15 - says Esping-Andersen, is that PSEC for 1-3 year olds is also very widespread and of 
consistently good quality. What is the evidence that Scandinavian PSEC contributes towards 
equalising educational outcomes?  
 
Esping-Andersen provides three main arguments for the impact of PSEC on educational 
inequality, mostly evidenced by the Scandinavian cases.  
 
Firstly, he shows that the availability of full-time PSEC, combined with generous provision 
for parental leave, raises the level and quality of mothers’ workforce participation. Because 
mothers in Denmark are not obliged to take long career breaks when they have children, and 
because they are legally entitled to return to work at their former level, they suffer less 
financial disadvantages from having children by comparison with mothers in many other 
countries with less family-friendly policies. This is particularly important for lone mothers 
who are likely to have higher earnings in Denmark and other Scandinavian countries than in 
most countries, and whose children are thus less likely to be brought up in poverty. This has 
significant consequences for education, says Esping-Andersen, because the link between lone 
parenting and child under-achievement in education – which is mostly the result of family 
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poverty – is weaker in Scandinavia than elsewhere. Results from various countries as 
different as Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, show that children from lone parent 
families generally do better in education when the mother is employed and the more so if the 
mothers are in relatively well-paid jobs. Given that a significant proportion of educational 
under-achievement across countries is associated with the effects of poverty in lone parent 
families, the mitigation of this in Scandinavia, argues Esping-Andersen, is likely to be 
contributing there to reducing the effects of social inheritance and overall social inequalities 
in educational outcomes. 
 
Secondly, Esping-Andersen argues that the over-time evidence for Scandinavia suggests that 
PSEC has contributed to the amelioration of educational inequality. According to his figures, 
the decline in social inheritance effects in Nordic countries between the 1960s and 1990s 
coincided with increases in participation in PSEC and rising levels of maternal employment. 
‘Indirectly,’ he writes, ‘there is evidence to suggest that the arrival of universal pre-school 
attendance is associated with a significant equalisation of school attainment and, one can 
argue, also links with the comparably quite homogenous performance in PISA…tests.’ The 
decline is most evident, he says, amongst the younger cohorts, who were the first to enjoy 
near universal participation in PSEC (p. 135). By contrast, in countries which have done less 
to universalise PSEC, such as Germany, the UK, and the USA, there was no equivalent 
decline in social inheritance effects over the last half century.  
 
Thirdly, Esping-Andersen cites the evidence from some studies that PSEC is particularly 
beneficial for children from disadvantaged families who benefit disproportionally from 
attendance. Since PSEC is near-universal in Scandinavian countries he claims that this would 
mean that a larger proportion of those most prone to educational under-achievement were 
receiving benefits which will serve to close the social gaps in attainment generally. His 
general argument is made as follows: 
 
‘If early child care were to compensate for unequal cultural capital, we would 
expect that the latter’s explanatory importance would be systematically weaker 
in the Nordic countries than elsewhere. The reasoning is that participation in 
child centres that are similar in quality across the board, so to speak, help 
cancel out the stimulus gap that children from low-educated and culturally 
weak homes suffer. Utilising again the PISA data this is in fact what we find. 
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The influence of parents’ cultural capital (and socio-economic status) is 
systematically lower in Scandinavia than elsewhere.’ (p. 136) 
 
The logic of Esping-Andersen’s case is certainly very compelling. However, the evidence for 
it is rather somewhat speculative, as his tentative tone implies. It is certainly the case that 
educational outcomes in Nordic countries are relatively equal, and that this is borne out by 
the relatively low social gradients for PISA scores in these countries.  However, Esping-
Andersen is not able to prove that this is due to the effects of near-universal PSEC rather 
than, say, the relatively egalitarian nature of the compulsory school systems (Green, Preston 
and Janmaat, 2006). The associational evidence he provides comes some way short of 
proving causality. In fact, what the OECD analysis of PISA data shows is that in most 
countries the benefits from PSEC attendance is roughly the same for children in all social 
groups. Whether PSEC provision is equalising education outcomes in any given country will 
therefore depend on how it is distributed. In fact, as the OECD show (2010), participation is 
PSEC in most countries is skewed towards children of higher social class families. This is 
even true in Scandinavia, despite near-universal provision, since, as Esping-Andersen admits, 
non-attendance in PSEC, particularly during the crucial earliest years, is most common 
amongst immigrant and poorer families.  It may be true that universal participation amongst 
1-6 year olds would equalise educational outcomes, although the OECD analysis does give 
evidence for this since it suggests that children from all social groups benefit equally. 
However, the fact is that participation in PSEC is not equally spread around children from 
different social groups, even in Scandinavia. Esping-Andersen tacitly accepts that this may be 
the case, by suggesting there may be a need for positive discrimination measures to equalise 
up-take of PSEC, even in the Scandinavian countries.    
 
Data, countries and variables 
In this paper we are using a compiled macro-dataset for the following countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. The variables included in the model can be 
classified in two groups: variables that vary over time and between countries and variables 
that are constant over time but vary between countries.  
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Time varying variables (they also vary between countries); these are collected for a period of 
29 years from 1980 to 2008. 
 
Logempt: the logarithm of the total employment rate. This is a dependent variable. 
 
Logempf: the logarithm of the female employment rate. This is a dependent variable. 
 
Logpresch: the logarithm of the gross enrolment ratio in pre-primary education. The gross 
enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown (in this case the age of 3 to 
6). Note the gross enrolment ratios will often exceed 100% since the numerator includes 
children outside of the 3-6 age cohort.  
 
Exp_unemp: social expenditure on unemployment as percentage of GDP (including active 
labour market policies). 
 
Prison: prison population rate; number of prisoners per 100000 inhabitants. 
 
Time constant variables (they vary between countries): 
 
Rig_emp: the index of rigidity of employment (0=less rigid; 100=more rigid). 
 
Unioncov: the index of union coverage. This is the percentage of employees covered by 
collective trade agreements. The variable is categorical (1 is under 25%, 2 between 25% and 
70%, and 3 over 70%).  
 
Coordin: the index of the level of wage coordination and bargaining. This is equal to the sum 
of union and employer coordination indices used in Nickel and Layard (1998). 
 
Benfrep: benefit replacement rate (the share of income replaced by unemployment benefits). 
 
Benfdur: the duration of unemployment benefits in number of years. 
 
Owner: The percentage of individuals who own their houses. This variable should act as a 
brake on labour force mobility. 
 
We also included the following variables: the degree of centralization of wage coordination 
(plant, firm, industry, or economy level); an index of employment protection (this is included 
in the World Bank’s rigidity of employment index); migrant stock; the ratio of minimum to 
average wage; taxes on labour; and union density. None of these variables had a significant 
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effect on total or female employment when we controlled for the aforementioned ones. For 
this reason they were taken out of the equation. 
 
The sources of the data are as follows:  
 
Logempt, Logempf, Prison, and Exp_unemp: OECD data. 
 
Logpresch and Rig_emp: World Bank data. 
 
Unioncov, Coordin, Benfrep, Benfdur, and Owner: Nickel and Layard (1998). 
 
It should be noted that the data was imputed for missing values before any analyses were 
conducted. For the imputation we used a Marcov Chain Monte-Carlo procedure (using an EM 
algorithm). The dataset contains 463 observations. 
 
 
Methodology 
In this paper, we are estimating five different models using the same data. These models vary 
in terms of their estimation methodology. The models are the following: 
 
The Simple OLS model.1
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   
𝑌𝑖: is the dependent variable for country i. 
𝑋𝑖: is a vector of characteristics of country i. 
𝜀𝑖: is the error term of the model. It follows a normal distribution with zero mean and a 
constant variance. 𝜀𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜏2). This error term is independent from all regressors, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖,𝑋𝑖) = 0. 
𝛽0: is the intercept of the model. 
𝛽1: is a vector of regression coefficients on the different independent variables.  
 
We start our analysis with a simple OLS regression. In this estimation the time dimension is 
dropped. In other words, we are considering that time observations for the same country are 
independent. Of course, this is an inefficient method to use given the nature of the time panel 
                                                     
1 All regressions are carried out using STATA. 
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we have (we have 29 observations per country over time). However, we start with this model 
in order to show how the rest of the regressions improve on it. 
 
 
The fixed effects model 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
𝑌𝑖𝑡: is the dependent variable of country i in year t. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡: is a vector of time-varying characteristics of country i in year t. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡: is the error term of the model. It follows a normal distribution with zero mean and a 
constant variance. 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜏2). This error term is independent from all regressors, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡,𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
𝛽𝑖: is the intercept of the model, with 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑖. 𝛽0 is the overall intercept and 𝜇𝑖 is a 
country-specific unobserved effect. This effect represents any unobserved country specific 
factors (related to its history, context, institutions, etc). 
𝛽1: is a vector of regression coefficients on the different independent variables. 
 
In this regression we estimate a fixed effects (FE) model using the same variables as before. 
However, in FE models time-constant variables cannot be included. Hence, the independent 
variables only include those that vary over time. It should also be noted that in FE models, 
the part of the intercept which is specific to the country 𝜇𝑖  is treated as non-random and 𝜇𝑖 is 
assumed to be not independent of 𝑋𝑖𝑡. 
 
The random effects model 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑡: is the dependent variable of country i in year t. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡: is a vector of time-varying characteristics of country i in year t. 
𝑍𝑖: is a vector of time-constant characteristics of country i. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡: is the error term of the model. It follows a normal distribution with zero mean and a 
constant variance. 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜏2). This error term is independent from all regressors,  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡,𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0 and  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡,𝑍𝑖) = 0. 
𝛽𝑖: is the intercept of the model, with 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑖. 𝛽0 is the overall intercept and 𝜇𝑖 is a 
country-specific unobserved effect. This effect represents any unobserved country specific 
factors (related to its history, context, institutions, etc). 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2: are vectors of regression coefficients on the different independent variables. 
 
In this regression we estimate a random effects (RE) model using all the variables from the 
simple linear regression. Note than in RE models it is possible to include time-constant 
variables. Further, in RE models the part of the intercept which is specific to the country 𝜇𝑖 is 
considered to be random and it follows a normal distribution with zero mean and a constant 
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variance 𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜏02). The random nature of 𝜇𝑖requires that it is independent from 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 
from 𝑍𝑖. In other words 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖,𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖,𝑍𝑖) = 0. Note that this model is 
estimated using a GLS random-effects with STATA. 
 
The random intercept model 
This model is exactly identical to the random effects model, except that the estimation is done 
using a maximum likelihood procedure. We estimate this model in order to compare it with 
the next one (the random slope model). For this comparison we are using the likelihood ratio 
test. 
 
The random coefficient model 
This model is similar to the random intercept model, but in addition to the random intercept 
we are introducing a random regression coefficient on Logpresch. The model is written as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑌𝑖𝑡: is the dependent variable of country i in year t. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡: the logarithm of the percentage of students attending PSEC in country i in year 
t. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡: is a vector of time-varying characteristics of country i in year t. 
𝑍𝑖: is a vector of time-constant characteristics of country i. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡: is the error term of the model. It follows a normal distribution with zero mean and a 
constant variance. 𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜏2). This error term is independent from all regressors,  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 0 , 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡,𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0 and  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖𝑡,𝑍𝑖) = 0. 
𝛽𝑖: is the intercept of the model, with 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑖. 𝛽0 is the overall intercept and 𝜇𝑖 is a 
country-specific unobserved effect. This effect represents any unobserved country specific 
factors (related to its history, context, institutions, etc). As before 𝜇𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜏02) and is 
independent from all regressors 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖,𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑖,𝑍𝑖). 
𝜆𝑖: is the regression coefficient on Logpresch, with 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆 + 𝜈𝑖. 𝜆 is the overall regression 
coefficient, and 𝜈𝑖 is a random part representing country i’s departure from the overall 
coefficient. 𝜈𝑖 can be seen as a specific country effect on the slope of Logpresch. It follows a 
normal distribution with zero mean and a constant variance 𝜈𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜏12). Further, it is 
considered to be independent from all regressors, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜈𝑖, 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜈𝑖,𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0 
and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜈𝑖,𝑍𝑖). 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2: are vectors of regression coefficients on the different independent variables. 
 
Note that in all of our models we do not model time heterogeneity explicitly. Time 
heterogeneity is absorbed in the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
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Statistical tests 
 
In our analyses, we are using two types of statistical tests. First, we use the Hausman test to 
compare the fixed effects to the random effects model. Secondly, we use the likelihood ratio 
test to compare the random intercept and the random coefficient models to the simple linear 
regression, and to compare the random coefficient to the random intercept model. The tests 
will allow us to identify which one is the most efficient. 
Results and findings 
The results for total employment. 
 Simple OLS FE RE Random intercept Random 
coefficient 
 Logempt Logempt Logempt Logempt Logempt 
      
Logpresch 0.0628 0.0789 0.0809 0.0809 0.2010 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
      
Rig_emp -0.0023  -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0024 
 (0.000)  (0.079) (0.088) (0.084) 
      
Unioncov -0.1241  -0.1363 -0.1363 -.1398 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Coordin 0.0782  0.09 0.0901 0.0967 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Exp_umemp -0.0592 -0.0489 -0.0494 -0.0494 -0.0347 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Benfrep 0.0034  0.003 0.0029 -0.0062 
 (0.000)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.603) 
      
Benfdur 0.0184  0.0249 0.0250 0.0309 
 (0.000)  (0.034) (0.038) (0.832) 
      
Prison 0.00002012 0.0002993 0.0002300 0.0002331 0.0001921 
 (0.444) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Owner 0.0029  0.0029 0.0029 0.0319 
 (0.000)  (0.033) (0.039) (0.072) 
      
Cons 3.6178 3.8812 3.4838 3.4833 1.7761 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Between Var  0.0169 0.0028 0.0030 0.4240 
     
Within Var  0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0008 
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Between Var  
on Logpresch 
    0.0581 
      
N 463 463 463 463 463 
p-values in parentheses 
 
Test statistics Statistic P Value 
Hausman statistics comparing RE to FE 4.14 0.24 
LR test comparing random intercept to linear regression 209 0 
LR test comparing random coefficient to linear regression 409 0 
LR test comparing random coefficient to random intercept 200 0 
 
Starting with the simple OLS regression, it is possible to see that all variables have a 
significant effect on total employment. In fact, an increase in PSEC attendance of 1% leads to 
an increase in total employment of 0.06%. Even though the coefficient is statistically 
significant, it is obvious that its impact is weak. However, this OLS regression is far less 
efficient than the random intercept and the random coefficient ones as indicated by the 
Likelihood Ratio Test. When the RE, and the random intercept were estimated (these two are 
identical as stated before, the only difference is that the former was estimated using a GLS 
random-effects, while the latter was estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure), the 
coefficient slightly increases to 0.08. However, when the random coefficient model was 
estimated the coefficient increased to 0.2%. In other words, an increase in PSEC of 10% 
(PSEC becoming more universal) leads to an increase in total employment of 2%. This effect 
still seems to be relatively weak, but one should keep in mind that there are many factors 
affecting employment with PSEC being only one of them. The effect of PSEC is not expected 
to be very strong on total employment because our main argument was that PSEC increases 
total employment by encouraging female employment. In other words, the effect on female 
employment should be larger than that on total employment. Further, the effect is expected to 
be disproportional. Put differently, a larger increase in PSEC attendance is required to boost 
employment by a smaller amount. This is intuitive because if the reverse was true, (ie a small 
increase in PSEC attendance would lead to a large increase in employment), then PSEC 
would be a miracle solution to unemployment. This is obviously not the case. PSEC is a 
feasible solution since it increases employment (total and female), but it is not the magic 
bullet for all problems. As we will see, other factors also have an effect on employment, and 
hence PSEC should be thought of as a factor that should be combined with others.  
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The Hausman test indicates clearly that the RE regression is better than the FE model. In 
other words, the RE model does not suffer from endogeneity bias since it passed the 
Hausman test. Further, the random intercept and the random coefficient models are better 
than the OLS regression since they passed the Likelihood Ratio Test (LR test). This was 
expected since the simple OLS regression does not take the time structure of the panel data 
into account. The LR test also proved that the random coefficient model is better than the 
random intercept one. This is a clear indication that the effect of PSEC attendance vary 
between countries. In other words, it is true that there is an overall effect of PSEC on 
employment across all countries and a departure from this effect for certain ones. Considering 
all the tests, it is possible to say that the best model is the random coefficient one. In what 
follows we interpret the results for the random coefficient model, while comparing them with 
those obtained from the other models. 
 
In the random coefficient model, an increase in PSEC attendance of 1% leads to an increase 
in total employment of 0.2%. In contrast, an increase in the index of the rigidity of 
unemployment of one unit leads to a decrease in total employment of 0.2%. The two 
variables that have the largest effect on employment are union coverage, and employer-
employee coordination. In fact, an increase in union coverage of one point leads to a decrease 
of total employment of 13.9%. And an increase in coordination of one point leads to an 
increase in employment of 9.6%. One should not be surprised that these effects are stronger 
than those of other variables; this happens because both variables are categorical. In fact, 
union coverage takes only three values according to how many people are covered by union 
agreements (1 is under 25%, 2 between 25% and 70%, and 3 over 70%). So, in case union 
coverage increases from 1 to 2, this means a major shift in the situation of a country (moving 
from one economic regime to another). The same applies for coordination. It is also 
interesting to note that union coverage and coordination vary in the opposite direction and 
that they almost cancel each other out.  
 
On the other hand, an increase in expenditure on unemployment of 1% (as a percentage of 
GDP) leads to a decrease in employment of 3.4%. Prison population also has a significant 
effect on total employment. An increase in prison population of one person (for every 
100,000) increases total employment by 0.019%. The effect is not as weak as it looks. For 
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instance, a country like Norway had a prison population of 55 individuals for every 100,000 
in 1995 while the USA has a prison population of 723 for every 100,000 in 2008. Hence, the 
difference between the two is 668 persons per 100,000, which corresponds to 12.69% in 
terms of total employment. One should note that prison population increases total 
employment because inmates are not considered members of the active labour force, so they 
are taken out of the denominator of the total employment rate. In more intuitive words, when 
prison population increases there will less individuals competing for the existing jobs, hence 
the total employment rate will be higher. 
 
The percentage of home owners has a positive effect on total employment. An increase in the 
percentage of home owners of 1% increases total employment of 3.1%. At first sight, this 
result seems to be unintuitive since we expected that home ownership would limit labour 
mobility and thus reduce employment. Nickel and Layard (1998) got the same result. Their 
argument was that the percentage of home owners is not correlated with the level of labour 
mobility in the countries they selected. Another reason is that whether home ownership 
would be a barrier to labour mobility depends on the flexibility of the real estate market. For 
instance, in large cities in the UK it used to be relatively easy to sell property and move to 
another location. Therefore, the basic assumption that home ownership would reduce 
employment does not seem to be true. Further, the positive effect that we find may be the 
macro reflection of the fact that the likelihood of owning a home is positively correlated with 
the likelihood of being in employment or, put simply, that employed individuals are more 
likely to buy property because they can afford it.   
 
Benefit replacement rate and benefit duration, have a significant effect across all models 
except in the last one (the random coefficient model). The loss of significance happens 
because we introduced a random coefficient on PSEC attendance. In other words, this 
random coefficient explains some of the between-country variance, and these two variables 
are time-constant so they can only explain the between-country variance. Hence, both the 
random coefficient and the two variables are competing for explaining the between-country 
variance (i.e. this variance is divided between the two) and therefore the two variables lose 
their significance. 
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Country 𝜆 𝜈𝑖 P Value on 𝜈𝑖 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆 + 𝜈𝑖 
Australia 0.201 -0.119 0.601 0.201 
Austria 0.201 -0.186 0.176 0.201 
Belgium 0.201 0.361 0.000 0.562 
Canada 0.201 -0.077 0.942 0.201 
Denmark 0.201 -0.084 0.387 0.201 
France 0.201 0.047 0.383 0.201 
Germany 0.201 0.099 0.266 0.201 
Ireland 0.201 0.645 0.000 0.846 
Italy 0.201 -0.057 0.475 0.201 
New Zealand 0.201 -0.166 0.000 0.035 
Norway 0.201 -0.159 0.014 0.042 
Spain 0.201 0.122 0.060 0.323 
Sweden 0.201 -0.089 0.000 0.112 
Switzerland 0.201 -0.122 0.137 0.201 
UK 0.201 -0.177 0.005 0.024 
USA 0.201 -0.036 0.662 0.201 
 
In this table, we interpret the random part of the regression coefficient on PSEC attendance 
(Logpresch). 𝜆 is the overall regression coefficient on PSEC, 𝜈𝑖 is PSEC’s country specific 
effect, and the P value indicates if this specific effect is significant or not. If  𝜈𝑖 is significant 
then it adds up to the overall regression coefficient; if it is not then the total effect of PSEC (𝜆𝑖) does not deviate from the overall regression coefficient (𝜆). The countries where the 
effect of PSEC does not deviate from that of the overall regression coefficient are: Australia, 
Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the USA. The countries 
where the effect of PSEC is above the overall regression coefficient are: Belgium, Ireland and 
Spain. In contrast, the countries where the effect of PSEC is below the overall regression 
coefficient are: New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. From these findings we can 
conclude that PSEC attendance works differently across the selected countries. In some it has 
a higher effect than the average (𝜆), and in others the reverse is true. The fact that the random 
coefficient model allows for a different coefficient for each country is the reason why this 
model is more efficient than the rest; it fits the data better. 
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The results for female employment. 
 Simple OLS FE RE Random 
intercept 
Random 
coefficient 
 Logempf Logempf Logempf Logempf Logempf 
      
Logpresch 0.1938 0.2649 0.2674 0.2674 0.6176 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Rig_emp -0.0035  -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0022 
 (0.000)  (0.368) (0.380) (0.089) 
      
Unioncov -0.2443  -0.2829 -0.2829 -0.2935 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Coordin 0.1549  0.1845 0.1846 0.1855 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Exp_umemp -0.0937 -0.0696 -0.0706 -0.0705 -0.0358 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Benfrep 0.0058  0.0047 0.0047 -0.0011 
 (0.000)  (0.041) (0.046) (0.972) 
      
Benfdur 0.0374  0.051 0.0512 0.2025 
 (0.000)  (0.074) (0.080) (0.600) 
      
Prison 0.0001638 0.0007468 0.0006342 0.0006385 0.0005584 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Owner 0.0061  0.0064 0.0064 0.0940 
 (0.000)  (0.057) (0.063) (0.045) 
      
Cons 2.5448 2.8707 2.0882 2.0874 -4.1065 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Between Var  0.0625 0.0169 0.0179 3.1576 
      
Within Var  0.0078 0.0078 0.0078 0.0029 
      
Between Var  
on Logpresch 
    0.4073 
      
N 463 463 463 463 463 
p-values in parentheses 
 
Test statistics Statistic P Value 
Hausman statistics comparing RE to FE 3.87 0.27 
LR test comparing random intercept to linear regression 274 0 
LR test comparing random coefficient to linear regression 598 0 
LR test comparing random coefficient to random intercept 324 0 
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The models for female employment are exactly identical to the previous ones except that the 
dependent variable is now different (i.e. female employment). It is worth noting from the start 
that the statistical tests generate the same results. The random coefficient model is still the 
superior model, since the LR test proves it to be better that the random intercept one, and the 
latter (which is identical to the random effects model) is better than the fixed effects model 
(hence the random models don’t suffer from endogeneity bias). And, of course, all random 
models are better than the simple OLS regression. In what follows we interpret the results 
from the random coefficient model while comparing them to the other models and to those 
for total employment.   
     
First, the effect of 1% increase in PSEC attendance on female employment increases from 
0.19% (OLS regression) to 0.26% (fixed and random effects models) to 0.61% (random 
coefficient model). Since the random coefficient model is by far the most reliable, it is 
possible to conclude that a 1% increase in PSEC attendance does lead to a 0.61% increase in 
female employment. In other words, if PSEC is made more universal (an increase of 10%) 
this would lead to an increase of female employment of 6.1%, which is substantial. When 
compared with the results for total employment, it is obvious that PSEC is more effective 
(three times more effective) in boosting female employment rather than total employment 
(recall the coefficient for total employment was 0.2%). This is not surprising since women 
are the major benefiters of PSEC. This confirms the argument that PSEC helps women to get 
back to work after childbirth. Hence, countries with higher levels of PSEC attendance are 
more likely to have higher levels of female employment.  
 
For the rest of the variables the results are as follows. An increase of one unit in the index of 
the rigidity of employment leads to a decrease of 0.2% in female employment. The 
magnitude of this effect is identical to that on total employment. On the other hand, the 
effects of union coverage and coordination become stronger. An increase of one unit in union 
coverage leads to a decrease of 29% in female employment. One reason for this is that unions 
are mostly dominated by men; hence the negative impact of union coverage on employment 
is exacerbated. For coordination, an increase of one unit leads to an increase in female 
employment of 18%. 
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The effect of expenditure on unemployment is almost the same as it was for total 
employment. An increase of 1% in expenditure on unemployment (as percentage of GDP) 
leads to a decrease in employment of 3.5%. Benefit replacement rate and benefit duration still 
have an insignificant effect (even though the two variables had a significant effect in the rest 
of the models). The reason for the loss of significance is the same as before; it happens 
because of the introduction of a random coefficient on PSEC attendance.  
 
The impact of prison population becomes five times higher. In fact, an increase of the prison 
population of one individual for each 100,000 inhabitants leads to an increase of 0.055% of 
female employment. This effect is economically strong for the same reason mentioned above. 
The difference between Norway’s prison population of 55 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants in 
1995 and that of the US (723 inmates per 100,000 inhabitants in 2008) correspond to 36.74% 
in terms of female employment. One should note that inmates are more likely to be males; 
hence there are less males competing for the existing jobs. In other words, females will have 
a higher probability of getting a job and therefore female employment will be higher. The 
percentage of home owners increases female employment, and this effect is higher than that 
for total employment. The reason for it being positive is the same as above. 
 
Country 𝜆 𝜈𝑖 P Value on 𝜈𝑖 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆 + 𝜈𝑖 
Australia 0.618 -0.130 0.452 0.618 
Austria 0.618 -0.378 0.038 0.240 
Belgium 0.618 1.116 0.000 1.734 
Canada 0.618 0.112 0.561 0.618 
Denmark 0.618 -0.360 0.098 0.258 
France 0.618 0.151 0.289 0.618 
Germany 0.618 0.270 0.186 0.618 
Ireland 0.618 1.637 0.000 2.255 
Italy 0.618 0.201 0.284 0.618 
New Zealand 0.618 -0.571 0.001 0.046 
Norway 0.618 -0.448 0.007 0.170 
Spain 0.618 0.158 0.341 0.618 
Sweden 0.618 -0.597 0.000 0.021 
Switzerland 0.618 -0.305 0.112 0.618 
UK 0.618 -0.568 0.001 0.049 
USA 0.618 -0.288 0.129 0.618 
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The countries where the effect of PSEC does not deviate from that of the overall regression 
coefficient are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the USA. 
The countries where the effect of PSEC is above the overall regression coefficient are: 
Belgium and Ireland. In contrast, the countries where the effect of PSEC is below the overall 
regression coefficient are: Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. 
From these findings we can conclude that PSEC attendance works differently across the 
selected countries.  
 
The reasons why the strength of the effect of PSEC on employment varies across countries is 
clearly very complex since a number of different variables are involved, including, for 
instance, cultural factors and mothers’ preferences. We can only speculate here on some 
explanations. The strong effect of PSEC participation on employment in Ireland may be high, 
for instance, because mothers of young children have a relatively strong preference for 
working (Evans and Kelly, 2001, p. 31). The weaker effects of PSEC on employment in the 
Scandinavian countries may be due to the fact that both PSEC participation rates and female 
employment rates are both very high, or because high female employment rates are being 
driven by factors other than PSEC participation (such as child-friendly employment practises 
at work). In the UK, the effects may be weaker because much of the PSEC participation is 
part-time, which allows fewer opportunities for mothers to work (at least in full-time jobs), or 
because preference amongst mothers for staying at home is still relatively high compared 
with other countries (19th highest out of 23 countries according to Evans and Kelly’s (ibid) 
data for 1994).  
 
PSEC effects on distribution of performance at 15 
The argument for the social benefits to children of PSEC rests on the claims that it tends to 
improve learning outcomes and that it mitigates the social gaps in learning outcomes. What 
evidence is there for this from a range of countries? 
 
The best evidence for the effects PSEC across a wide range of countries comes from the 
OECD PISA studies. PISA contains self-reported data from students on whether they had 
more than one year of pre-primary education, one year or none. Not surprisingly, PISA data 
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show considerable variation across countries in the prevalence and duration of PSEC 
participation. In Belgium, France, Hungary, Iceland, Japan and the Netherlands, for instance, 
more than 90% of students report having had more than one year of pre-school education, 
whereas in Canada, Chile, Ireland, and Poland less than 50% of students report having had 
more than one year of pre-primary education. On average across the OECD 72% of students 
report attending more than one year of pre-primary education. PISA data does not 
discriminate between students who have had two or three or four years of pre-primary 
education, unfortunately. However, as Esping-Andersen (2009) has pointed out, since in the 
more affluent countries most children have at least two years of pre-primary education, the 
major differences are probably between those where children typically participate for one or 
two years and those where the majority attend from one or two years of age for three or four 
years.  
 
In all of the 34 OECD countries students who attended pre-primary education for more than 
one year out-performed those who did not at 15 years of age (by an average of 54 points). 
Even after controlling for social background, attending for more than one year increased 
performance on average by 33 points. However, there is substantial variation between 
countries in how much performance enhancement at 15 is associated with pre-primary 
participation. Attendance for more than one year adds over 100 points on average, before 
controls for social background (ESCS), in Belgium, France and Israel, but less than 30 points 
in Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Korea, Netherlands and Slovenia. OECD note that the variations 
in quality and average duration of pre-primary education probably account for the differences 
between countries here (OECD, 2010, 11, p. 98). 
 
However, the data do not support the claim that widespread uptake of pre-primary 
education reduces the social gaps in performance. In our analysis we used data from 
PISA on the social gradients in performance at 15 years in 2009 and data from PISA 
and UNESCO on PSEC participation rates. The PISA data on participation give the 
proportion of students in the survey who report having had more than one year in pre-
school education (in the late 1990s). The UNESCO data give the ‘gross participation 
rates’ in pre-school education, based on administrative data for the year 1996/7. The 
gross participation rate is the number of children (of any age) in pre-school education 
divided by the population aged 3-6 years. The latter data provide a more fine-grained 
27 
 
measurement of the variation in participation across countries, since they capture all the 
variation in duration of attendance, whereas the PISA data treats all participation of 
more than one year as one category. The range on the X axis on Figure Two is 
considerably greater than on Figure One. 
 
Figures 1 and 2, below, plot, for a range of countries, the social gradients in performance at 
15 against PSEC participation rates from, respectively, PISA (Figure 1) and UNESCO 
(Figure 2). In both cases the correlations are not significant (r = .26; p = .18; N = 28 using the 
PISA measure; r = .20; p = .27; N = 33 using the UNESCO measure). Figure 1 shows that in 
some countries where PSEC participation was very high, the social gradients are still high, as 
in France and Belgium, whilst in others they are considerably lower, as in Norway and 
Iceland. On the other hand, in countries where participation in PSEC was low, social 
gradients can be high, as in Australia, or low as in Ireland and Canada. The UK had a 
relatively high social gradient for performance at 15 in 2009 and below average enrolment 
rates in PSEC in the late 1990s, particularly when the latter is measured using the UNESCO 
gross enrolment rate measure which captures better the duration of PSEC participation.  
 
Figure 1  
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
The OECD note that ‘[d]isadvantaged and advantaged students benefit equally from pre-
primary attendance in 31 of the 34 OECD states.’ (2010, 98). It is only in the USA that 
disadvantaged students seem to benefit more. This being the case, PSEC will only mitigate 
inequalities at 15 in most countries where participation is skewed towards less advantaged 
children. However, this does not seem to be the case, even in countries like the Nordics, 
where participation rates overall are highest.  
 
The OECD data on the benefits from PSEC to different social groups shows how this works. 
In the first table we present the results published in the OECD report on PISA 2009 (OECD, 
2010, Volume 2, Annex B1, Table II.5.7, part 2). In the second we present the results 
published in the same report (Annex B1, Table II.5.5, part 2 & table II.1.2, part 1). The 
results in the first table were obtained through the regression of reading performance scores 
on the following variables:  
• Student attended pre-primary school (PSEC attendance as a binary variable). 
• Student’s socio-economic background (ESCS). 
• (student attended pre-primary school)*(student’s socio-economic background). This is 
an interaction term between PSEC attendance and ESCS that measures the additional 
returns to ESCS if a student attended PSEC. 
• A square of student’s socio-economic background. This term is included to reflect the 
nonlinear relation between ESCS and performance scores. 
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•  School’s socio-economic background. This is average ESCS at the school level. 
•  Gender. 
• Student with an immigrant background. 
• School in rural area. 
• School in a city. 
• School size.  
• A square of school size. 
• Private school. 
 
The first column of the first table reports the regression coefficient on PSEC attendance 
(those who attended against those who did not, with the latter being the reference group). As 
we can see the effect of attending PSEC is positive and significant across all countries except 
Austria, Norway, and the USA where it is insignificant. The second column reports the 
regression coefficient on ESCS (the OECD variable for parental income and status), which is 
the return to social status. The coefficients are significant and positive in all countries except 
in Belgium, Germany, and Italy. The third column reports the regression coefficient on the 
interaction term between PSEC attendance and ESCS This interaction term represents the 
additional return to 1 unit increase in ESCS if the student attended PSEC. As we can see, the 
results are mostly insignificant across all countries except in Norway and the USA. 
According to Esping-Andersen’s theory, this coefficient should have been negative and 
significant. In other words, attending PSEC should mitigate the effect of ESCS; or more 
simply, those with higher ESCS should benefit less from PSEC (the reverse is also true: those 
with lower ESCS would benefit more from PSEC). 
 
In the second table, it is possible to see that the return to PSEC decreases after accounting for 
ESCS in the regression. Further, when ESCS is taken alone its effect is insignificant in 
Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA. When comparing the two tables, one 
may notice that the return to PSEC (second table) decreases further when all the controls are 
accounted for (first table). This happens because the variation in performance scores is now 
explained by more variables. Note that the results in the first table are more reliable since 
they rely on multivariate regressions. 
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Country 
The return to 
attending PSEC 
The return to 
ESCS 
The additional return on ESCS for 
students who attended PSEC 
Australia 30 32 -2 
Austria 6 19 -9 
Belgium 45 13 0 
Canada 21 12 7 
Denmark 32 24 3 
France m m m 
Germany 22 1 11 
Ireland 10 23 8 
Italy 34 -5 11 
New Zealand 25 34 3 
Norway 9 13 23 
Spain 25 16 3 
Sweden 22 31 0 
Switzerland 36 24 -7 
UK 36 26 0 
USA 3 50 -24 
Values that are statistically significant are indicated in bold. The values for France are missing because 
the school questionnaire was not administered. 
 
  
Difference in student performance in reading between 
students who report having attended pre-primary school 
(ISCED 0) for more than one year and those without pre-
primary school attendance.   
Country 
Before accounting for the 
socio-economic background 
of students 
After accounting for the 
socio-economic background 
of students 
Returns on 
ESCS (taken 
alone)2
Australia 
 
60 39 46 
Austria 42 21 48 
Belgium 103 76 47 
Canada 48 33 32 
Denmark 84 58 36 
France 108 65 51 
Germany 61 40 44 
Ireland 24 8 39 
Italy 79 65 32 
New Zealand 60 39 52 
Norway 31 18 36 
Spain 53 39 29 
                                                     
2 Note that the return to ESCS was obtained through a single-level bivariate regression of performance scores on 
ESCS. However, one should keep in mind that bivariate regressions are less reliable than multivariate ones. 
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Sweden 58 38 43 
Switzerland 84 59 40 
UK 76 57 44 
USA 46 12 42 
Values that are statistically significant are indicated in bold. 
 
From all these results, one can conclude that PSEC participation in itself boosts reading 
performance in most countries; the same is also true for ESCS since higher ESCS students 
are likely to achieve better results. However, in contrast with Esping-Andersen’s theory, 
PSEC does not seem to reduce the positive impact of ESCS on reading performance scores. 
In the UK, for instance, there is no mitigation of social gaps in performance at 15 through 
PSEC. Hence, we can conclude that PSEC attendance does boost reading performance but it 
does not help reduce the impact of social inequalities on them. 
 
The two exceptions to this general finding are Norway and the USA. In both countries PSEC 
does not have a significant direct effect on performance scores. However, in Norway the 
additional return on ESCS for students who attended PSEC is positive while in the USA it is 
negative. In other words, in Norway PSEC exacerbates inequalities because it increases the 
returns on ESCS and the reverse is true in the USA. One should note that the direct returns on 
ESCS are very low in Norway while they are very high in the USA. This means that in these 
two countries, respectively, PSEC increases social inequalities (resulting from ESCS) when 
they are too low and reduces them when they are too high.  
 
It should be noted that we estimated different variants of this model by dividing ESCS into 
categorical variables (above and below country average ESCS, the top tercile versus the 
bottom tercile, and the top quartile versus the bottom quartile). All these models confirmed 
the results published in the PISA report. PSEC does not reduce the impact of ESCS on 
performance scores in most countries. 
 
Conclusion 
Our conclusions from this analysis do support the idea that high level PSEC provision is, to 
some extent, a ‘win-win’ policy, having both economic and social benefits. High rates of 
child participation in PSEC tend to occur where PSEC provision is widely available at an 
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affordable cost and a high level of participation does tend to increase female employment 
rates. The effect of PSEC on total employment is relatively small, but that on female 
employment is sufficiently strong to consider PSEC as a major instrument in boosting female 
employment. PSEC attendance also substantially increases fifteen-year-old reading 
performance scores on average in all countries, which will lead to social benefits both for 
individuals and society. However, there is little evidence to support the larger claims that 
high levels of PSEC participation mitigate social gaps in performance at 15. The reason for 
this would appear to be that whereas all children benefit similarly from PSEC participation in 
most countries, participation is not biased towards less advantaged groups. Even, as in the 
Scandinavian countries, where participation is at a very high level, attendance among 0-2 
year olds is least likely amongst children from the most disadvantaged countries.  
 
The important implication of this for policy is that for PSEC to reduce social gaps in school 
attainment it is not sufficient merely to increase aggregate PSEC participation rates. It would 
require policies with a substantial bias towards children from disadvantaged families so that 
they receive more – or better quality – PSEC than children from other social groups. Policy in 
England seems to be moving in this direction. On Sept 19th 2011 the Department for 
Education set out plans to extend the existing free entitlement to 15 hours per week of PSEC, 
which currently applies to all three and four year olds, to all disadvantaged two year olds ie 
for those qualifying for free school means or in local authority care. This should increase 
PSEC participation rates for disadvantaged families. DFE estimates that approximately 
140,000 two year olds would be eligible to benefit. The question is whether the measure will 
increase participation amongst lower income families sufficiently to substantially reduce 
social gaps in achievement.    
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